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I. INTRODUCTION

Unilateral trade restrictions employed for purposes of environmental
protection have become an important issue in the trade-environment debate.
They directly challenge the free trade principles of the WTO/GATT system
and are likely to become more common as environmental concerns increase.
When the first GATT panel report in the Tuna Dolphin dispute was
released,1 environmentalists were outraged at its finding that the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [hereinafter GATI'] could override
environmental measures because of their trade-restricting effect.2 That
report was never adopted, but a second GATT panel has recently considered

* Professor of Law, Newcastle Law School, University of Newcastle upon Tyne. The
author would like to thank Professor Thomas J. Schoenbaum for his helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this article.
' Panel report on "United States - Restrictions on Import of Tuna", General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade: Basic Instruments and Selected Documents [hereinafter GATr, BISD]
39S/155, reprintedin 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) (not yet adopted) [hereinafter Tuna Dolphin 1].
The complaint was brought by Mexico, with ten other countries and the European Community
submitting arguments. Id. at 161-91.
2 One commentator suggests that "the panel seemed to go out of its way to validate the
popular caricature of the GATT as an inflexible, myopic, moss-grown institution inherently
indifferent, if not downright antagonistic, toward ecological protection." Steve Charnovitz,
The Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23 ENVT'L L. 475, 482 (1993).
But note that he later acknowledges that the danger posed to the environment by the GATT
is exaggerated. Id. at 488.
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the same issues in Tuna Dolphin jj.3 In addition, there have been other
important panel reports concerned with the same or parallel issues: the U.S.
Alcohol" and U.S. Automobile Taxes 5 reports.
The Tuna Dolphin dispute concerned U.S. import bans under the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972 on tuna caught with purse seine
nets; the bans had been put into effect because the high dolphin mortality
caused by the method of capture was considered to be environmentally
unacceptable. 6 The measures complained of in the U.S. Automobile Taxes
dispute also were based on the grounds of environmental protection. They
consisted of a luxury tax imposed on the basis of price, a "gas guzzler" tax
imposed on the basis of fuel consumption, and the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) regulation, which required manufacturers to produce a
specified average fuel economy across their domestic and exported fleets,
enforceable by financial penalties.7 In a different vein, but raising similar
issues, the U.S. Alcohol dispute was concerned with a variety of federal and
state restrictions on the sale of alcohol, many of which were reputedly
designed to control alcohol distribution and to protect human health and
public morals.8
All of these disputes were concerned with the validity of unilateral
measures restricting trade. Even if the reports remain unadopted, they are
part of the growing GATT jurisprudence on the interpretation and application
of its provisions. The panel reports were clearly informed, not only by the
arguments of the parties, but by the considerable academic literature which

3 Panel report on "United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna", 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994)
(not yet adopted) [hereinafter Tuna Dolphin Ill. The complaint was brought by the European
Economic Community and the Netherlands on the basis of the same legislation, with some
amendments, as complained of in Tuna Dolphin I.
4 Panel report on "United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages",
GATT, BISD 39S/206 [hereinafter U.S. Alcohol].
5 Panel report on "United States -Taxes on Automobiles", GATT, DS31/R, reprinted
in
33 I.L.M. 1397 (1994) (not yet adopted) [hereinafter U.S. Automobile Taxes]. See also Steve
Charnovitz, The GATT PanelDecisionon Automobile Taxes, INT'L ENV'T REP., Nov. 2, 1994,
at 921.
6 Tuna Dolphin I, supra note 1, at 156-57.
U.S. Automobile Taxes, supra note 5, at 1400 ff.
8 U.S. Alcohol, supra note 4, at 206 ff.
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followed the Tuna Dolphin I report9 and they will, in their turn, influence
the future debate. This paper examines the extent to which these recent
panel reports have developed the legal interpretation of Articles 1H and
XX(b) and (g) of the GATT. Finally, it asks whether there is now any
future for environmental unilateralism and, if so, to what extent it should be
permitted and how it may be accommodated within the WTO/GATT system.
H. ARTICLE m OF THE GATT
Article m: 1 of the GATT provides that internal taxes and other charges,
and laws, regulations and requirements that affect the sale or distribution of
products should not be applied so as to afford protection to domestic
products.' Those laws, regulations and requirements are also subject to a
more stringent test under Article 111:4 which provides that imported products

9 See, e.g., Carol J. Beyers, The U.S./Mexico Tuna Embargo Dispute: A Case Study of
the GATT and Environmental Progress, 16 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 229 (1992); Dorothy
J. Black, Note, International Trade v. Environmental Protection: The Case of the U.S.
Embargo on Mexican Tuna, 24 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 123 (1992); Steve Charnovitz,
Environmentalism Confronts GATT Rules, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 37 (1993); Christopher A.
Cherry, EnvironmentalRegulation Within the GATT Regime: A New Definition of "Product",
40 UCLA L. REV. 1061 (1993); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade with
Preservation of the Global Commons: Can We Prosperand Protect?, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1407 (1992); Matthew H. Hurlock, Note, The GATT, U.S. Law and the Environment:
A Proposalto Amend the GATT in Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 92 COLUM. L. REv.
2098 (1992); John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence
or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227 (1992); Elizabeth E. Kruis, Comment, The
United States Trade Embargo on Mexican Tuna: A Necessary ConservationistMeasure or
an Unfair Trade Barrier?,14 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 903 (1992); Janet McDonald,
Greening the GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental Protection in the New
World Order, 23 ENvr'L L. 397 (1992); Ted L. McDorman, The 1991 U.S.-Mexico GATT
Panel Report on Tuna and Dolphin: Implications For Trade And Environment Conflicts, 17
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 461 (1992); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free InternationalTrade
and Protectionof the Environment. IrreconcilableConflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700 (1992).
10Article 111:1 states:
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products,
and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or
use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied
to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production.
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must be given treatment no less favourable than that given to like domestic
products.11 A similar sort of provision applies to taxes and other charges
under Article 111:2.12 The first sentence of that paragraph prohibits the
imposition of direct or indirect charges on imported goods which are in
excess of those imposed on like domestic products. The second sentence
repeats the obligation contained in Article I:1 that taxes and charges may
not be used to protect domestic production, but this is widened to include,
not just 'like products', but products which are directly competitive or
substitutable with each other."
As Professor John H. Jackson pointed out, Article M has such a direct
effect on the internal policies of governments that "it becomes more quickly
embroiled in domestic politics than any other GATT obligation."' 4 Equally,
it has proved to be a major stumbling block with regard to unilaterally
imposed environmental standards. Since the whole purpose behind such
restrictions is to discriminate between products on the basis of their
environmental impact, it is clear that Article III is going to be a point of
conflict. This is particularly true because the principles on which environmental distinctions might be made are likely to be very different from those
adopted in the WTO/GAT" system for trade purposes. 5
At first reading, the test laid out in Article III falls into two parts. First,
it must be decided whether the products being differentiated between are

Article 111:4 states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to 'like products' of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use....
12 Article 1m:2 states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess
of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.
Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or
other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner
contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.
13Interpretative Note, GATr Annex I, Ad Article Ill, Para. 2 [hereinafter Interpretative
Note]. For a discussion of the drafting history and purpose behind this provision, see JOHN
H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 279-86 (1969).
14 JACKSON, supra note 13, at 274.
S See Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 43-44; Charnovitz, supra note 9, text at nn.62-74.
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'like products'. If they are not 'like', then any differentiation will be
consistent with Article I. If they are 'like', then differentiation can only be
consistent if it does not afford either protection to domestic production
16
('protective effect') or less favourable treatment to imported products.
However, this linear interpretation has caused difficulties when applied to
domestic policies which do not have any overt protective aim or effect. It
relies upon the question of whether products are 'like' before considering the
effect of the measure, and can lead to a finding of inconsistency purely on
the existence of differentiation, regardless of its intention. It may therefore
preclude consideration of policies behind the differentiation even where there
is no protective effect or less favourable treatment. As a result, it should be
asked whether the test should be applied in an integrated and purposive
manner, limiting its effect to overtly trade issues."
The issue whether products are 'like' is central to the question of whether
differentiation is consistent with Article Irn. It is convenient to consider
three questions separately: 1) What is meant by 'like products'? 2) Should
a distinction based on processing and production methods (PPMs) be
allowed? 3) How important is the issue of protective effect in deciding
whether differentiation is legitimate?
A. 'Like Products'
The importance of the concept of 'like products' has been somewhat
obscured by the finding of the Tuna Dolphin I panel that Article III only
applies to regulations affecting 'products as such' and not, for example, the
circumstances of their production." This interpretation has been followed,
with varying degrees of explicitness, by the later panel reports concerned
with Article HL. 9 In that analysis, regulations which differentiate between
products on the basis of factors other than their physical characteristics
16 This

is the analysis used in the Panel Report on "Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and

Labelling Practices on Imported Wine and Alcoholic Beverages", GATT, BISD 34S/83, para.
5.5 [hereinafter Japan Alcohol].
"' For example, the E.C. and Japan were in disagreement on this issue in the Japan
Alcohol dispute. Id. at paras. 5.3-5.4.
1s Tuna Dolphin , supra note 1, at paras. 5.11-5.15.
'9As Schoenbaum points out, this interpretation is in line with previous panel reports.
Schoenbaum, supra note 9, at 710. See also Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 3, at paras. 5.8-5.9;
U.S. Alcohol, supra note 4, at para. 5.19; U.S. Automobile Taxes, supra note 5, at paras. 5.525.54.
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cannot fall within Article I on the basis that such regulations would, by
definition, be distinguishing between products that are 'like'.' However,
the question of 'likeness' bears further consideration.
On the face of it, the Tuna Dolphin I panel's interpretation when applied
to 'like products' is difficult to disagree with. 'Likeness' is usually
expressed by reference to physical similarity, components or function. In
this sense, tuna is tuna, no matter how it has been caught. The fact that
dolphins and other marine life were "incidentally" taken with the tuna does
not affect the essential nature of the tuna itself. If a product is defined by
reference to its function or physical design, then it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to suggest that tuna fish caught by one method is essentially
different from one caught by another. The result of the panel's reasoning is
that, even if the limits on dolphin kills had been applied identically to the
domestic and importing industries, there would still have been a finding of
discrimination between 'like products'. 21 But, as noted above, this precludes any further discussion of what might be considered 'like' by reference
to a particular aspect of the product and whether the measure does in fact
constitute protection of domestic producers or less favourable treatment of
imported products.
The term 'like products' (or its equivalent) is used throughout the GATT
for different purposes. As a result, there is no general definition of the term
and its meaning will depend upon the purpose of the provision in which it
is located.22 In addition, there is a tendency to define the term according
to the facts of each case. A general statement was made by the Working
Party on Border Tax Adjustments in 19703 to the effect that the term 'like
products' should be defined on a case-by-case basis, according to criteria
appropriate to it. It suggested some possible criteria: the product's end-use
in the market, consumers' tastes and habits, which change from country to
country, and the product's properties, nature and quality.'
In some cases, this test has been relatively easy to apply. In the

0 As a result, the MMPA regulations could not be brought under Article IH; the
implication was that U.S.-caught tuna and Mexican-caught tuna were 'like' and that any
differentiation between them would be inconsistent with Article l.
21 This is apart from the possibility of showing that the effect is to protect domestic
production, perhaps because the required methods of capture are already possessed by the
domestic industry and would be expensive for the importing industry to acquire.
2 See, e.g., Japan Alcohol, supra note 16, at para. 5.6.
3 Report of the Working Party on "Border Tax Adjustments," GAIT, BISD 18S/97.
Ild. at para. 18.
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Superfund dispute,' for example, the products being compared for purposes
of import taxes consisted of different types of oil, gasoline and other liquid
hydrocarbon products. The domestic and imported products in question were
either identical with each other or had substantially the same end-uses, and
the panel had little difficulty in categorizing them as 'like products' for the
purposes of Article 111:2.26 But in many cases, the issues are not so
straightforward and the choice of grouping may be more difficult. A case
in point is the JapanAlcohol panel report, which dealt with the problem of
comparing different kinds of alcoholic drinks for purposes of taxation. The
E.C. argued that they had been grouped together in such a way as to afford
protection to domestic producers and with the result that charges were
imposed on imported drinks that were in excess of those imposed on like
domestic products.2 7 The products in that case included gin, vodka,
whisky, grape brandy, fruit brandy, still wine and sparkling wine. The panel
found that items that fell within each of these headings were 'like products'
for the purposes of the first sentence of Article m:2 prohibiting internal
taxes in excess of those imposed on like domestic products. 2 However, the
second sentence prohibits taxation being used in order to protect domestic
production, not only with regard to "like domestic products", but also
"directly competitive or substitutable" products.29 In applying this rule, the
panel grouped the drinks differently. Gin, vodka and brandies were grouped
together as imported and domestic distilled liquors. Imported and domestic
unsweetened and sweetened still wines were put into a separate group, as
were imported and domestic sparkling wines. The panel thus found that
spirits competed directly against each other whereas still and sparkling wines
did not.30
On what criteria were these classifications based? It would, after all, be
possible to say that all alcoholic drinks were in competition with each other,
or that all wines were in competition, and so on. The panel recognized that
even the more restrictive term, 'like products', could be interpreted in several
different ways. In this particular case, they had been convinced by the

25 Panel report on "United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances",
GATT, BISD 34S/136 [hereinafter Supeifund dispute].
' Id. at para. 5.1.1.
2 Japan Alcohol, supra note 16, at para. 3.A.
Id
M at para. 5.6
Interpretative Note, supra note 13, at para. 2.
30 Japan Alcohol, supra note 16, at para. 5.7
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similarity of end-use, objective criteria such as composition and manufacturing processes, and subjective criteria such as consumer tastes and consumption.31 Nonetheless, they were concerned that the linking of products by
reference to criteria such as consumer preference could be used to encourage
and fix those preferences through taxation. Existing patterns of consumption
should not, therefore, always be decisive of what constitutes 'like
products'. 32 Otherwise, products would be prevented from entering into
genuine competition which might lead to a change in those patterns. This
argument applies even more strongly when considering the classification of
"directly competitive or substitutable" products. On the other hand, other
criteria such as end-use should be treated cautiously where changing
circumstances or technology may throw previously non-rival products into
competition with each other.
The tension comes from the two opposing tendencies to draw on present
trade patterns both to define 'likeness' and to allow for the possibility of
change; it is exacerbated by the absence of any precise test. The arguments
discussed above have been used primarily to achieve liberalization of trade
by avoiding over-reliance on existing competitive patterns. However, they
indicate that there is a strong relationship between the concept of 'like
products' and the policy of preventing protective effects. Where a tax or
regulatory grouping has a protective effect, it will be more likely to lead to
a finding of 'likeness'. On the other hand, these arguments may also be
used to suggest a flexibility of interpretation which would permit the
integration of important values and concerns arising from outside the context
of trade where there is no protective effect. In particular, they suggest that
the linear interpretation referred to above may be overly rigid and artificial.
Some evidence that the literalist approach in the GATT might be softened
arose obliquely in the U.S. Alcohol panel report, in which the panel indicated
reservations about interfering unduly with the internal regulatory independence of national governments.33 In particular, it expressed concern about
the implications of classifying items as 'like products' and the basis on
which that classification should be made. Specifically, it said, 'The purpose
of Article III is not to harmonize the internal taxes and regulations of

31id.
32 id.

33 U.S. Alcohol, supra note 4. See also discussion of this report in Paul Demaret & Raoul
Stewardson, Border Tax Adjustments under GATT and E.C. Law and General Implications
for Environmental Taxes, J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1994, at 5, 36-39.
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contracting parties.
."' In other words, Article III should not be applied
too literally, so as to have more wide-ranging effects on internal policies and
laws than necessary beyond protecting the rights of other contracting parties
to the GATT. In particular, it was "imperative that the like product
determination in the context of Article M be made in such a way that it not
unnecessarily infringe upon the regulatory authority and domestic policy
options of contracting parties." '
One of the complaints raised in U.S. Alcohol related to restrictions on
points of sale, distribution and labelling which applied differently to lowalcohol and high-alcohol beers.' Canada claimed that the effect of this
differentiation, although it apparently applied equally to domestic and
imported products, was to discriminate in fact against Canadian beer. 7 In
its view, all beers should be classified as 'like products'. The panel, on the
other hand, found that it was possible to make a legitimate differentiation
based on alcoholic strength. 8 As in Japan Alcohol, it was possible to say
that all beer was the same or even to suggest a different basis for differentiation. The right to decide exactly how beer was to be grouped was given to
the government in question, provided that there was no evidence of
protective effect. Thus, the legitimacy of the differentiation was not derived
from trade-related considerations such as end-use or consumer preference,
but from a non-trade policy which had no discernible protective effect.
In the U.S. Automobile Taxes dispute, two of the measures at issue were
taxes on luxury cars at or above a certain set price, and a progressive 'gas
guzzler' tax on cars with fuel consumption falling below specified thresholds.39 In the absence of evidence to substantiate claims by the E.C. that
they had any protective intention or effect,' the panel was content to accept
that the differentiation made by the taxes between products which might

34 U.S. Alcohol, supra
3

note 4, at para. 5.71.

Id. at para. 5.72.

3 Id. at paras. 5.70-5.77. Another complaint related to a lower rate of taxation applied
to wines, regardless of origin, provided they used a particular kind of grape. Because it only

grew in the region of the state in question, there was no difficulty in identifying a protective
effect against other North American wine producers and thus it was considered appropriate
to group together wines made from different grapes as 'liRe products'. Id. at paras. 5.23-5.26.
37 Id. at para. 3.120.
38 Id. at paras. 5.76, 6.1(r).
39 U.S. Automobile Taxes, supra note 5, at para. 1.1.
'0 In the case of the gas guzzler tax, this was despite the panel's acceptance of the fact
that E.C. automobiles bore most of the tax. Id. at para. 5.22.
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otherwise have been considered 'like products' was legitimate. The
interpretation employed by the panel was therefore very similar to the
integrationist approach of the U.S. Alcohol panel, and it explicitly refers to
the latter's report in its reasoning. 4 That is to say, it permitted governmental policy to determine the question of 'likeness' and the primary limitation
became the question of whether there was protective effect.
The third measure considered by the U.S. Automobile Taxes panel caused
more difficulties. The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulation
requires the payment of charges where the average fuel economy of the cars
manufactured by a particular producer falls below a specified level.42 The
panel examined the use of 'fleet averaging', which requires manufacturers
to achieve average fuel consumption targets across the whole of their range
of products.43 The E.C. had argued that this constituted less favourable
treatment of their cars because it targeted their specialized manufacturers
who were unable to average their high-consumption vehicles with lowconsumption vehicles."
The panel did not examine this argument. 45 Instead, it returned to the
argument employed by the Tuna Dolphin I panel, referred to at the beginning
of this section, that regulations under Article I must relate to 'products as
such'. It found that the test of averaging across a whole fleet of cars is
concerned with the activities of the producers, in the sense or their ownership
and control arrangements, rather than with the product itself and, as a result,
was inconsistent with Article II:4.'
The test of 'products as such'
severely restricts the scope for interpreting the concept of 'like products' and,
in particular, it excludes regulation on the basis of production and processing
methods which will often form the basis of unilateral environmental
measures.

41Id. at para. 5.7, n.128.
42 Id. at paras. 2.14-2.24.
43 Id. at para. 2.16.
4Id.

at para. 3.266 ff.

4' Id. at para. 5.54.
4Id at para. 5.52. However, this criterion could be saved under Article XX(g) on the

grounds that it was primarily aimed at making effective equivalent restrictions on domestic
producers.

1995]

ENVIRONMENTAL UNILATERALISM

B. Productionand ProcessingMethods
As stated in the previous section, much of the discussion on 'like
products' is contingent on the finding of the Tuna Dolphin I panel that
Article Ill only applies to 'products as such' and the consequent limiting of
differentiation to physical characteristics of the product in question.47 This
interpretation has been followed by panel reports after Tuna Dolphin I.
It is largely derived from the fact that Article III consistently uses the term
"product"; it follows that Article I only applies to taxes or regulations
which concern 'products as such' and not other characteristics related to a
product.49 However, this arguably imports too much significance into a
literal reading of the provision. It permits the concept of "product" to preempt the purpose of the article as a whole, which is to prevent protection of
domestic production and less favourable treatment of imported products,
rather than allowing other tests to be used to achieve the same aim. Another
ground for the 'product as such' test is an analogy with direct and indirect
taxes in the practice of border tax adjustments under Article I, although
there are variations that occur in that practice which would also support a
less literal reading of paragraphs 2 and 4.'°
However, the most powerful justification for limiting differentiation to
'products as such' is concern that measures might otherwise be used to
protect domestic producers or impair competitive conditions for imported
products. The Tuna DolphinII panel made this explicit by emphasizing that
the measures in question were being applied indirectly, not to the product
itself, but to the policies of other countries in an effort to force change in
those policies."' The coercive nature of the measures meant that the
legitimacy of the policy purposes behind them was not even considered.5 2
The U.S. Automobile Taxes panel gave a different variation of this concern
by referring to the need to ensure the security of tariff bindings made under

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
49 Tuna Dolphin I, supra note 1, at paras. 5.11-5.12, 5.15.
" For a detailed discussion of this question, see Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 33,
especially at 16-20, 23-29, and 58-61; Thaggert, 'Like Products': Product and Process
Methods in the Trade and Environment Context, in TRADE AND THE ENViRONMENT-THE
47

SEARCH FOR BALANCE

(James Cameron et al. eds., 1994).

5' Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 3, at para. 5.24.
52 The same argument was used with regard to Article XX, see infra.
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53
Article I.
The perceived threat was that the imposition of measures that
distinguish on the basis of non-physical characteristics would open up the
opportunity to circumvent previously agreed import arrangements. But this
concern about indirect or disguised protectionism only requires a test to
determine and avoid protective effects.'
In other words, even though these concerns about protectionism are
legitimate and fundamental to the proper working of the WTO/GATT
system, the solution is not necessarily tied to 'products as such.' The
essential requirements of a measure that differentiates between products in
competition with each other should include the following: 1) it should
employ an objective test for differentiation which satisfies the need for
certainty and lack of arbitrariness; 2) it should have no protective intention;
3) it should have no protective effect. In the words of the U.S. Automobile
Taxes panel, it should not create "categories ...of inherently foreign or
domestic origin.""
But differentiation based on the physical characteristics of a product will
not necessarily satisfy these requirements, and limiting permissible differentiation to this category may unnecessarily exclude other, non-protectionist
measures. For example, regulating the sale of beef from cows treated with
hormones may rely upon physical characteristics for differentiation but leaves
unanswered the question of whether it has a protective aim or effect.
Similarly, regulating the sale of pharmaceuticals produced with a particular
manufacturing method which carries a risk of contamination, even where
there is no physical trace in a given batch, could not be called uncertain or
arbitrary and can still be exposed to the normal investigation for protective
aim or effect. Thus the requirement that measures be concerned only with
'products as such' is not a sufficient test in itself and may be over-inclusive.
In particular, it excludes the incorporation or accommodation of other, nontrade values even where they have no protective purpose.
In practice, the test of what measures apply to 'products as such' is
already showing signs of ambiguity after the U.S. Automobile Taxes panel

53 U.S. Automobile Taxes, supra note 5, at para. 5.53. See also JapanAlcohol, supra note
16, at para. 5.5(b); Panel report on "Spain - Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee", GATIT,
BISD 28S/102.
- See, for example, the confident approach of the same panel to the question of whether
the luxury and gas guzzler taxes had a protectionist aim or effect. It stated and applied such
a test, presumably on the basis that it was both reliable and workable. See U.S. Automobile
Taxes, supra note 5, paras. 5.9-5.15, 5.24-5.26, 5.29-5.32, discussed infra.
55Id. at para. 5.25.
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report. There is no particular difficulty in accepting that the fuel consumption of a particular car as measured for the gas guzzler tax relates to the
physical characteristics, or performance, of the product in question. It is
possible also to gloss over the fact that the tax is based on an evaluation of
the model rather than of each individual automobile, on the grounds that this
is necessary for the practical operation of the measure. However, it is more
difficult to see why the factor of price, which is used to trigger the luxury
tax, should represent a physical characteristic. It is a result of decisions on
marketing strategies and production processes, and it is not clear why this
should be distinguished from ownership or control arrangements of
companies, on which the CAFE regulation was found to be inconsistent
because it did not apply to the "product as such." To say that one relates to
the product as such and that the other one does not, is to make an arbitrary
distinction-it would be no more arbitrary to permit differentiation on nonphysical grounds between products on objective, non-protectionist policies
applied equally to domestic and imported products.
For example, it would be possible to rely less on what is physically part
of a product and concentrate on what is inherent to it. A distinction could
be made between, on the one hand, methods which form the economic or
social backdrop to production, such as social security or national health
provision and, on the other, methods which are intrinsically bound up with
the collection, processing or production methods, such as the use of prison
labor without adequate pay, 6 fishing methods which inevitably cause
dolphin deaths, or manufacturing processes which inevitably allow the escape
of noxious substances into the atmosphere or seas. A distinction may be
made between conditions which form a background or context to a
production process, and conditions that are an inherent part of that production process."
Such an approach would successfully incorporate the
Montreal Protocol's potential ban on products manufactured with listed
substances while ensuring that unilateral environmental measures based on
PPMs would still be subject to appropriate limitations. It would permit the

56 See,

e.g., Article XX(e), which permits restrictions on "products of prison labor".

" This would be consistent with the findings in the Belgian Family Allowances Panel
Report, GATT, BISD 1S/59. See also discussion of direct and indirect taxes for purposes of
border tax adjustment in Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 33. Clearly there would be
increased difficulties in administering and applying a test that would be less clearcut than one
relying purely on physical characteristics of a product, though the burden of proof would lie

on the party claiming the right to differentiate.
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emphasis to shift from the mechanistic test of 'like products' and 'products
as such' to the test which lies at the heart of Article III, that of protective
effect or less favourable treatment.
C. Domestic Protection or Less Favourable Treatment
Whether differentiation between 'like products' is in itself a violation of
Article III or whether there must also be shown protective effect or less
favourable treatment depends both on the purpose of the specific provision
and the principles of the GATT as a whole. If differentiation in itself
constitutes a violation of Article III, the question of 'likeness' becomes the
crucial and pre-emptive part of the test. However, if protective effect or less
favourable treatment must also be shown, then there is some room for
accommodating unilateral environmental measures without destroying the
purpose or effectiveness of Article III.
Despite the important relationship between 'likeness' and protective effect,
the panels have not consistently defined its role in the operation of Article
III as a whole. In the Tuna Dolphin I panel report, the measure at issue was
a ban on imports and therefore of sales of tuna. Since the import ban
operated directly against foreign caught tuna, less favourable treatment could
be assumed, although no finding was made on this point.5" However, in the
later cases, the measures much more clearly applied equally to both domestic
and foreign products because they governed products once they had entered
the domestic market. The JapanAlcohol panel had examined the issues in
two separate stages: first, whether the products involved were 'like products'
or directly competitive, and only secondly, whether the taxes were discriminatory or protective. 9 In U.S. Alcohol, however, the panel emphasized that
the purpose of Article III was to prevent protection of domestic production
and not to prevent the use of internal fiscal or regulatory powers for other
purposes. The limitations should be found by reference to the purpose of
Article III.
Since the primary purpose of Article I is to promote competitive
openness, the act of defining 'like products' should take into account the
question of protective effect. This argument is similar to that used in Japan
Alcohol in the sense that the 'likeness' of products ultimately relates to the
question of whether they compete against each other and thus should not be

58 Tuna Dolphin I, supra note 1, at para. 5.16.
59 Japan Alcohol, supra note 16, at para. 5.5(d).
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construed so narrowly that they must be identical. But the panel in U.S.
Alcohol goes further-it moves away from the linear interpretation adopted
in the earlier panel report and toward a more integrated and purposive
approach. It finds an inherent link between the definition of 'like products'
and the purpose behind the differentiation between products, rather than
treating them as separate and consecutive questions.
Although the U.S. Alcohol panel was clearly aware of the importance of
this relationship, it is not clear from its findings whether it considered that
the definition of 'like products' should be contingent upon the existence of
a protective effect, or whether it is a separate definition which is subordinate
to the test of protective effect. At one point, the panel appears to be arguing
that, once 'likeness' is established, any differentiation is illegal whether or
not there is a protective effect6 It accepts that any differentiation between
'like products' based on standardization, environmental purposes or other
similar policies will be inconsistent with Article I. As a result, the panel
argues that the determination of 'likeness' should be made so as to avoid
"unnecessary" encroachment upon "the regulatory authority and domestic
policy options" of contracting parties.6 '
However, even if a finding of 'likeness' is avoided, evidence of a
protective effect resulting from differentiation between similar products will
be sufficient to fall foul of Article III and will lead itself to a finding of
'likeness' for the purposes of that article. 62 It is not clear whether this is
entirely separate from the 'like product' question, or whether it is an implicit
answer to it since the panel did not give a definitive explanation. Instead,
it finally asked and answered both questions. It dealt firstly with the
question of whether high and low alcohol beers should be considered 'like
products', and found that domestic policy could legitimately distinguish
between them.63 This was confirmed by the answer to the second question
of whether there was protection of domestic production; the panel found that
the regulations applied to beer whether imported or domestically produced
and thus there was no protection of domestic production and no inconsistency with Article III.'

60 U.S. Alcohol, supra note 4, at para. 5.72. The panel in U.S. Automobile Taxes, supra
note 5, shows some ambivalence on this point at paras 5.6-5.9, 5.54-5.55.
61 U.S. Alcohol, supra note 4, at para. 5.72.

6 Id. at

paras. 5.73.
Id. at paras. 5.74-5.75.
"I at para. 5.73, 5.77.
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The reasoning of the U.S. Alcohol panel suggests that, if it could be shown
that there was no protection of the domestic industry and that imported
products were subject only to indirect differentiation through the implementation of a non-trade policy, the policy discretion of the state should be
allowed to determine the question of whether products are 'like'. Thus, lack
of protective effect becomes operative in the determination of 'likeness'.
This argument would apply even more forcefully under the second sentence
of Article 111:2, with its wider test of "directly competitive or substitutable"
products. 65 It allows us to pursue the idea that a linear interpretation of
Article m is no longer appropriate and that the question of 'likeness' may
be determined by the non-trade and non-protective policy of a government.66
These are merely hints in U.S. Alcohol that the use of purposive
interpretation and the need to protect internal regulatory autonomy might be
used to soften the effect of findings such as Tuna Dolphin I. Such a
softening would give explicit recognition to the need to protect the right of
contracting parties to introduce different rules concerning non-trade issues,
notwithstanding their incidental trade-restricting effects.6' Some adoption
of this reasoning can be seen in the U.S. Automobile Taxes panel report.
With regard to the luxury tax, the panel had accepted that products could not
be identical and that the real question was to identify the differences which,
if used to differentiate between products, would lead to less favourable
treatment." It identified the avoidance of protection to domestic production
as the "central purpose" of Article .69 Except in the most obvious of
cases, the question of 'likeness' "should be analyzed primarily in terms of
whether less favorable treatment was based on a regulatory distinction taken
so as to afford protection to domestic production."7 ° Any investigation into
protection of domestic production should include examination of any

Interpretative Note, supra note 13.
"The panel in U.S. Automobile Taxes, supra note 5, adopts this line of reasoning in
relation to the luxury and 'gas guzzler' taxes at paras. 5.7-5.8, 5.23.
67 Note that the European Court of Justice has followed this reasoning in order to allow
national regulatory disparities to remain despite their incidental trade effects if intended to
fulfil an approved policy objective ('mandatory requirement'). This is subject to the right of
the E.C. to substitute a comprehensive harmonization scheme. See, e.g., Cassis de Dijon
Case, Case 120178, [1979] ECR 649; Danish Bottles Case, Case 302/86, [1988] ECR 4607.
U.S. Automobile Taxes, supra note 5, at para. 5.6.
Id. at para. 5.7.
70Id. at para. 5.9
6
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protective aim and protective effect.7 Thus the panel identified and applied
a test which related primarily to the protective nature of a measure in order
to determine 'likeness' for the purposes of Article n.72
However, this approach was not applied uniformly with regard to the
CAFE regulation. This regulation requires the payment of charges where the
average fuel economy of the cars manufactured by a particular producer falls
below a specified level. The panel examined two aspects separately. One
aspect was the use of 'separate foreign fleet accounting' which requires
manufacturers to satisfy the fuel economy requirements for its domestic and
foreign car fleets separately. 3 The panel found that this requirement
prevented foreign manufacturers from using their domestic and foreign cars
to balance each other out in the same way as U.S. producers could.74 As
a result, it constituted less favourable treatment and was therefore inconsistent with Article RI:4.75 The question of 'like products' was not an issue
because it was assumed that the requirement affected the cars "as products."
The crucial test was therefore whether there was less favourable treatment.
However, when the panel examined the second aspect of the CAFE
regulation, that of 'fleet averaging' (which calculates fuel consumption across
the range of a manufacturer's products), it used a different approach. It
applied the 'product as such' test and found that the basis of differentiation
concerned the activities of the producers and not the products themselves.76
As a result, it found that it was inconsistent with Article In. 7
This part of the finding is not without ambiguity. In the next paragraph,
it refers to the test as being applied to less favourable treatment of an
imported product.7" It makes this clear by saying that, to the extent that the
CAFE measure differentiated on the basis of factors relating to producers and
importers rather than to the 'product as such', "it could not in accordance
with Article 1I:4 be applied in a manner that also accorded less favourable
79
treatment to products of foreign origin.,

7I d. at para. 5.10.
72It employed the same reasoning with regard to the gas guzzler tax. Id. at para. 5.23.
See generally, id. at paras. 5.9-5.15, 5.24-5.26, 5.29-5.32.
73Id. at para. 5.47.
74id.
7' Id. at para. 5.49.
76 Id. at para. 5.50.
77 Id. at para. 5.52.
SId. at para. 5.53.
9 Id. at para. 5.54 (emphasis added).
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The need to show less favourable treatment seems to be part of the test to

be applied. However, the panel merely points out that the requirement as it
related to non-product factors "could thus result in treatment less favourable"
to imported products," and does not consider whether the effect of the
CAFE regulation does in fact have this result. Thus the panel appears to be
accepting that there must be protection of domestic production of less
favourable treatment of imported products in order to find inconsistency with
Article llI, but is content to assume that this will occur whenever differentiation is made on the basis of criteria separate from the product itself.
D. Summary

After examining these three separate, but interlinked, questions, it may be
seen that the relationship between 'like products' and the need to prevent
protective effects of unilateral measures is complex and not yet definitively
explained. At present, the debate is largely confined by the issue of
'products as such', but this imposes an inappropriately narrow limitation and
unnecessarily excludes unilateral measures which constitute neither protection
of domestic producers nor less favourable treatment of imported products.
In other respects, the question of 'likeness' between differentiated products
should be examined in relation to the second question of whether there is
protective effect or less favourable treatment before deciding whether a
measure is inconsistent or not. But, by insisting on the 'product as such'
test, mere differentiation between what are deemed to be 'like products'
becomes sufficient to find inconsistency without any consideration of the
second part of the test regarding protective effect or less favourable
treatment. Instead, the policy of Article IH, which is to prevent protection
and less favourable treatment, should be emphasized and the definition of
'like products' should be extended on a case-by-case basis without the
limitation of the 'product as such' test. 'Likeness' should include consideration not only of physical characteristics of a product, but also of characteristics inherent in its production.
Finally, it might be argued that Article III should be interpreted as strictly
as possible and that the linear and literal interpretation is both appropriate
and intended by the founding states. This argument would rely upon the
existence of the exceptions established in Article XX. As a matter of
drafting and treaty interpretation, this position is certainly tenable, but it
go I at para. 5.55.
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ignores the need to incorporate and accommodate urgent policies unrelated
to trade. To interpret a prohibition broadly is to increase the burden of a
contracting party relying upon the exception which will, in any case, be
interpreted narrowly. It permits the nature of the dispute settlement forum
to dictate the limits of the argument, in this case firmly within the confines
of trade liberalization and without reference to other legitimate interests of
the contracting parties.
LI.

ARTICLE XX OF THE

GATT

Under the reasoning discussed above, unilateral environmental measures
may be found to be inconsistent with Article 1L81 and, as a result, much
will depend on the possible application of the exceptions contained in Article
XX. 2 Since they are defenses, the burden of showing that Article XX
applies belongs to the respondent states3 and the protection it offers is to be
construed as narrowly as possible within the meaning of the words." This
is reinforced by the preambular conditions that exceptions must not
"constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail," nor be "a disguised restriction
on international trade." 5
Article XX(b) provides that trade-restricting measures may be employed
where they are "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."
Article XX(g) provides that measures may be taken "relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
81

Where they constitute import restrictions, they will also be found to violate Article XI,

as in Tuna Dolphin 1, supra note 1, and Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 3.
' For a general analysis of Article XX, see JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM, 206-08 (1989); Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the EnvironmentalExceptions in GATT
Article XX, 25 J. WORLD TRADE 37 (1991); Jan Klabbers, Jurisprudence in International
Trade Law: Article XX of the GAYT, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 63 (1992).
83 See Panel report on "Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act",

GATT, BISD 30S/140, para. 5.20; Panel report on "United States - Section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930", GATT, BISD 36S/345, para. 5.27 [hereinafter Tariff Act].
' See Tuna Dolphin I, supra note 1, at para. 5.22; U.S. Alcohol, supra note 4, at para.
5.41.
as GATT, art. XX. See Panel report on "United States - Prohibition of Imports of Tuna
and Tuna Products from Canada", GATT, BISD 29S/91, para. 4.8 [hereinafter Canada Tuna];
Panel report on "United States - Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies", GATT,
BISD 30S/107, paras. 54-56 [hereinafter Spring Assemblies].
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consumption." The Tuna Dolphin panels considered both paragraphs,
although they each conflated much of their reasoning.' Article XX(g) was
also considered by the U.S. Automobile Taxes panel. 7 The U.S. Automobile Taxes panel found that the CAFE regulation could be partly saved under
Article XX(g),88 whereas the Tuna Dolphin II panel found that the MMPA
measures could not be brought under either Article XX(g) or (b). 9
The panels in Tuna Dolphin II and U.S. Automobile Taxes began by
considering whether the measure was intended to implement a policy falling
within the relevant paragraphs. They then examined whether the measures
were either "relating to" or "necessary" for its objective under paragraphs (g)
and (b) respectively. Since their findings on these points were conclusive,
neither panel considered the question of whether the measures were also
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" or "a disguised restriction on
international trade." In essence, the reasoning of the Tuna Dolphin II panel
on Article XX pivoted on the issues of extraterritoriality, directness and
coercion. However, it should also be asked whether more weight should
have been given to the preambular conditions by considering whether the
measures under the MMPA were in fact discriminatory or disguised trade
restrictions.
A. Extraterritoriality
One of the key issues in the Tuna Dolphin I dispute was whether a
country was entitled to invoke Article XX(b) or (g) with regard to animals
or exhaustible natural resources lying outside its territorial jurisdiction. The
Tuna Dolphin I panel had found that only those resources lying within the
jurisdiction of the country concerned could be covered by the defense. 90
This was one of the more controversial findings of that panel, since it
appears to exclude any trade measures designed to protect resources in the
global commons and, accordingly, the Tuna Dolphin II panel considered the
question in some detail.
It should be emphasized that the first panel did not use the term 'extraterr-

" Tuna Dolphin I, supra note 1, at paras. 5.22-5.34; Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 3, at
paras. 5.11-5.39.
87 U.S. Automobile Taxes, supra note 5, at paras. 5.56-5.66.

u Id.
89Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 3, at para. 6.1.
90Tuna Dolphin L supra note 1,at para. 5.30.
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itorial'; rather, it referred to the question of the 'extrajurisdictional'
application of Article XX(g). 9 1 The Tuna Dolphin H panel adopted the
distinction, although it developed the argument more explicitly. It appears
to accept that Article XX(g) can have extraterritorial reach, 92 but only
insofar as international law permits governments to exercise jurisdiction over
their nationals and vessels outside their territory. 93 Thus, measures could
apparently be extraterritorial but not extrajurisdictional.
Both of the Tuna Dolphin panels acknowledged that the wording of
Article XX was not conclusive on this point."4 The Tuna Dolphin H panel
was therefore required to examine other evidence as to the intentions of the
parties. Some evidence could be derived from the fact that, at the time of
the GATIT's creation, states were already familiar with extraterritorial traderestricting measures designed to protect environmental interests. As a result,
it has been argued, there can be no assumption that Article XX(g) was
intended to exclude such measures. 9" This is essentially a negative
argument rather than a positive one; it can only suggest that extraterritoriality
is not excluded by Article XX(b), rather than that it is positively included.
The Tuna Dolphin 11 panel addressed these arguments by considering the
application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties on the use of
preparatory work, subsequent practice" and supplementary means of
interpretation.' 7 It found that many of the treaties which provided for the
protection of environmental resources outside extraterritorial jurisdiction
through trade and other measures were not relevant because they were
concluded prior to the GATT or were not specifically concerned with the
subject matter of the GATT. 9' Prior treaties clearly cannot be used as
91 Id. at
92

para. 5.33.

The panel noted that two previous panels had dealt with migratory fish without

distinguishing between fish caught within territorial jurisdiction. Tuna Dolphin II, supra note
3, at para. 5.15.
93Id.at para. 5.20.
9 Tuna Dolphin I, supra note 1, at para. 5.25; Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 3, at paras.
5.15, 5.31.
" See Charnovitz, supra note 82, at 39-41, 52 (criticizing this finding on the basis of the
history of international agreements intended to protect non-domestic interests); Dunoff, supra
note 9, at 1416-18 (making same argument). But other writers have interpreted the historical
evidence differently. See Chamovitz, supra note 2, at 497 n.93; Jackson, supra note 9, at
1341-42.
9 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31 [8 I.L.M. 691 (1969)].
97Id., Article 32.
" Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 3, at paras. 5.19-5.20.
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subsequent practice, but it does seem curious that the panel did not consider
the position of later treaties such as the Basel Convention," Montreal
Protocol"'0 and CITES;10 ' they were raised by the United States as
examples of treaties employing trade measures in order to protect global
environmental interests" ° and have been widely ratified by countries that
are also party to the GATr. It is by no means clear that such agreements
are entirely separate from the interpretation or application of the GATT rules
on import restrictions. They explicitly provide for measures which constitute
exceptions to the rules of the GATT, something which is certainly very close
to interpreting and applying them. Of course, if such treaties were to be
used as interpretative tools, they would be limited to their specific subject
matter and would not have affected the issues at stake in the Tuna Dolphin
dispute. But, in a general sense, they certainly invite the possibility that
extrajurisdictional interests may be brought within Article XX. °3
Within the provisions of the GATT itself, the Tuna Dolphin II panel also
referred to the existence of other parts of Article XX which incorporate
extraterritorial issues, namely paragraph (e), which permits trade restrictions
to be imposed on products of prison labor."° From that, it concluded that
the GATT did not prohibit absolutely measures with extraterritorial effect,
but no other inferences were drawn. 5 But paragraph (e) is not just
extraterritorial in its reach; it is also extrajurisdictional. The panel failed to
examine the full implications of this.
On its reading of the evidence, however, the panel chose to limit the
legitimate policies under paragraphs (b) and (g) to those within a country's
jurisdiction over its nationals and vessels. This finding invites a discussion
of the concept of jurisdiction and the limitations imposed upon it by

" Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989).
00
' Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987).
0 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,

Mar. 3, 1973, reprintedin 12 I.L.M. 1085 (1973).
"oSee, e.g., Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 3, at paras. 3.14, 3.21-3.23.
103SErnst-Ulrich Petersmann, InternationalTrade Law andInternationalEnvironmental
Law: Preventionand Settlement of InternationalEnvironmental Disputes in GAiT, J. WoRLD
TRADE, Feb. 1993, at 43, 73-77.
104Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 3, at para. 5.16.
105 Id.
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international law."16 The panel's reasoning is based, in effect, on the
theory of active personality jurisdiction. This is best known in relation to
the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, which is limited because its exercise
over foreign nationals may interfere with the sovereign rights of other states
to control the activities of their own citizens. Even so, there is some state
practice supporting objective territorial jurisdiction where the effect of the
crime occurs within a state,"°7 passive personality jurisdiction arising where
the victim rather than the perpetrator of the crime is a national,"° and,
more commonly, protective jurisdiction where there is a risk to the security
of the state."
In addition, there are increasing examples of universal
jurisdiction, arising purely from the nature of the act. 10
In the field of commercial law, there is some state practice supporting the
"effects" doctrine, giving jurisdiction to a state based on acts occurring
outside its territory but which have direct and substantial effects in that
state."1 Although this is a controversial area to say the least, much of the
debate is about the limitations on, rather than the right to, the exercise of
such jurisdiction. 1 2 In general, the international law principles of nonintervention, the need for a genuine link between the state and the subject of
its jurisdiction, the prohibition on abuse of jurisdiction, comity and
proportionality are the principal limitations. The U.S. courts, in particular,
have also developed a judicial rule of reason to accommodate the need to
balance the interests of the states involved. 1
Finally, in the field of state responsibility, there is a well-established

'06 It deserves a more detailed discussion than is possible here, but see BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 298-311 (4th ed., 1987). See also Petersmann,
supra note 103, at 70; Charnovitz, supra note 2, text at nn.94-102.
'o

See the Lotus Case, P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.10 (1927).

'"See Cutting Case, Moore, Digest, ii.228-42, although this type of jurisdiction is highly

controversial.
" See, e.g., Joyce v. Directorof Public Prosecutions [1946] A.C. 347.
110 See, e.g., Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958, Article 19 (jurisdiction over

piracy on the high seas); Hague Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft 1970; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons 1973.
.1.
See, e.g., Mannington Mils, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979).

For a discussion of the general international law principles and the position in U.S. and E.C.
law, see, for example, WHISH, COMPETrON LAW (3rd ed.), 368-85; David J. Gerber, The
ExtraterritorialApplication of the German Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 756 (1983).
11' See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 106, at 307-11.
113See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
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principle that a state may not permit its territory to be used in such a way as
to injure another state." 4 This would logically extend to the acts of
nationals even outside the territorial jurisdiction of that state. The right of
the injured state to respond by seeking reparation is undoubted. Likewise,
a trade measure used in response to injurious acts could be justified."'
Unilateral environmental trade measures do not deal with the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction, but there is an attempt to protect interests, both
domestic and shared, which could be covered by state practice in the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction. This would be most clearly seen when the aim
of the measure was to prevent damage which would directly affect the health
within the country itself, such as transboundary pollution or damage to the
ozone layer. But it would also apply to cases where there was danger to a
shared resource, such as a fish stock. Here, the interests of the state are
brought directly into play and the exercise of jurisdiction would be in line
with much of state practice.
Should a distinction be made between unilateral measures which are used
to prevent harm to direct economic interests and others which are used to
enforce a choice of values, assuming that such a division of interests can be
satisfactorily defined? In the Tuna Dolphin II dispute, it had been argued
that the only resources that could be protected as "exhaustible natural
resources" under paragraph (g) were those which needed conservation, that
is, which were already endangered. The panel found, however, that it was
sufficient if the resource was potentially exhaustible." 6 The Tuna Dolphin
II panel was perhaps too generous in assuming that an "exhaustible natural
resource" includes a species which is still self-propagating and not presently
in danger of extinction. The unnecessary or incidental killing of dolphins is
repugnant to many people, but ultimately it can be seen as a question of
values as to whether it should be permitted to continue. Where a species is
in actual danger of becoming extinct, there is a much greater interest on the
part of all states because of the economic effects that may accrue directly or
because of the unknown effects of extinction on the ecosystem inhabited by
that species. It may then fall into the same category as damage being done

Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905; Corfu Channel Case, I.C.J. Rep. 4 (1949).
'" See Petersmann, supra note 103, at 70.
16 Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 3, at para. 5.13. Similarly, the panel in U.S. Automobile
14

Taxes found that gasoline was derived from petroleum which was an exhaustible natural
resource and therefore that a policy to conserve gasoline fell within the meaning of Article
XX(g). U.S. Automobile Taxes, supra note 5, at para. 5.57.
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to the ozone layer or the creation of atmospheric pollution. A question of
values may be reasonably confined to the sphere of multilateral negotiation
and persuasion; the direct involvement of the economic interests of other
states justifies a response beyond mere "active personality" jurisdiction and
can be incorporated into the logic of the Tuna Dolphin I1 panel's reasoning.117

However, all of this discussion is in danger of being moot. The question
remains of exactly what the panel meant by saying that policies that fall
within the jurisdiction of a state over its nationals and vessels will also fall
within the scope of Article XX(b) and (g). It appears to refer not merely to
domestic territorial interests, but also to shared extraterritorial resources
exploited by those nationals and vessels. Further, it appears to relate to
domestic and shared resources that may be protected by restraints on those
nationals and vessels. Logically, this would mean that protection of such
animals or exhaustible resources must fall under Article XX(b) and (g).
For example, the Tuna Dolphin II panel explicitly accepted that the policy
"to conserve dolphins in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean" pursued by the
United States fell within paragraph (g)." 8 However, this does not seem to
be borne out by the other arguments used by the panel on the question of
whether the interests that might be protected under Article XX(g) should be
limited to the essentially domestic sphere. Both the Tuna Dolphin II and
U.S. Automobile Taxes panels accepted that the policies being implemented
by the measures in question fell within the scope of Article XX(g). But they
both took a restrictive view in the second stage of their analysis.
The second question concerning Article XX(g) was whether the measures
complained of could be considered as "relating to" the conservation of an
exhaustible resource "in conjunction with" domestic restrictions. Previous
panels had found that "in conjunction with" meant "primarily aimed at" the
purpose of conservation and "primarily aimed at" making equivalent
domestic restrictions effective." 9 The phrase "in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption" has been interpreted not only
it Ultimately, although this deserves a fuller discussion than is possible in this paper, the
question should be asked whether unilateral trade restrictions are in fact the exercise of
jurisdiction over activities outside the state. The acts considered by these GATT panels were
concerned with entry into and sale within the territorial jurisdiction of the state. See
Petersmann, supra note 103, at 69 n.50.
Is Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 3, at para. 5.20.
"1 Panel report on "Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon", GATr, BISD 35S/98, para. 4.6; Tuna Dolphin 1, supra note 1, at para. 5.31.
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as meaning that the import restriction must be reflected by a corresponding
restriction on domestic producers," but also that it must be designed and
intended to make those domestic restrictions effective.'
This interpretation was accepted by both panels."
Therefore, the measure to be brought under Article XX(g) must be given
a supporting role only; the emphasis is placed firmly on the domestic nature
of the policy, and therefore of the interest to be protected. The Tuna
Dolphin I panel accordingly found Article XX(g) inapplicable to the MMPA
measures. 23 It argued that a country can only effectively control production and consumption in so far as it falls within its jurisdiction, and therefore
the paragraph could only apply to policies within the jurisdiction of the
country concemed.1 2'
However, there appears to be a danger of overemphasizing the domestic
restriction aspect of this test. It is clear from the wording that there must be
an equivalent restriction of domestic production or consumption. But trade
measures might be "primarily aimed at" making domestic restrictions
effective by ensuring that reciprocal measures are taken by others and thus
that domestic producers are not forced to trade in unfavourable competitive
conditions. Thus it is not clear that the phrase "in conjunction with" is
intended to mean that the trade measures must be intended specifically to
enforce, rather than to reinforce, the domestic restrictions.
The idea of reinforcement rather than enforcement might be seen in the
finding of the panel in the U.S. Automobile Taxes dispute, although it
adopted on its face the same interpretation as the Tuna Dolphin panels.
Since it identified the aim of the CAFE regulation as being to "promote fuel
efficiency of cars circulating in the United States," it found that it was
necessary to impose restrictions on the fuel consumption of imported cars in
order not to prejudice that aim."z As a result, it would have allowed fleet
'20

CanadaTuna, supra note 85, at 108-9.

121Id.

at para. 4.6.

'22 Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 3, at para. 5.22 (adding that not only the purpose but also
the effect of a measure should be "primarily aimed at"); U.S. Automobiles Taxes, supra note
5, at para. 5.29.
'
Tuna Dolphin 1, supra note 1, at para. 5.34.
Ild. at para. 5.31.
'2 The panel acknowledged that fleet averaging, which was inconsistent with Article III
because it differentiated on the basis of the ownership or control of producers, was not the
only measure available to achieve the aim of fuel conservation. This was not relevant
because the test in Article XX(g) is that the measure must be "relating to" conservation, not
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averaging of fuel economy under Article XX(g) even though it was based on
activities of producers outside U.S. jurisdiction, presumably because the
conservation policy being implemented applied within the territory of the
United States.
But, arguably, this approach should also apply to the free-rider problem
that typically arises in the conservation of common resources in areas of res
communis. To interpret otherwise would mean that only those resources
falling within the exclusive (i.e., territorial) jurisdiction of a country would
be relevant, and that the finding by the Tuna Dolphin II panel that Article
XX(g) covers policies falling within the jurisdiction of a country over its
nationals and vessels is meaningless.
B. Directness and Coercion
In addition to the reasoning discussed above, the Tuna Dolphin II panel
found that the measures could not be "primarily aimed at" their objective
under Article XX(g) because they were indirect and coercive."n It applied
the same arguments to deny that they were "necessary" under Article
XX(b). 27 The panel accepted the definition of "necessary" given by
previous panels, to the effect that there must be no alternative measure
consistent with the GATT available and that the least inconsistent alternative
should be employed."2 However, its finding that the MMPA measures

that it must be "necessary". U.S. Automobile Taxes, supra note 5, at para. 5.63.
'26 Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 3, at paras. 5.24-5.27. The panel also denied that the U.S.
measures were primarily aimed at conservation because the levels of permissible dolphin
taking were calculated according to the quantity taken by the U.S. fishing industry. Since the
Mexican fishing industry could not know at any given time whether they were conforming
to the required levels, the resulting unpredictability could not be considered to be "primarily
aimed at" conservation. Id. at para. 5.33.
127 Id. at paras. 5.37-5.39.
'2 Id. at para. 5.35.
See Tariff Act, supra note 83, at para. 5.26; Panel report on
"Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes", GAIT, BISD
37S/200, paras. 5.36-5.39; Tuna Dolphin 1, supra note 1, at para. 5.27. See also U.S. Alcohol,
supra note 4, at paras. 5.40-43, 5.52; Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 of the Rio Conference, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.151/4 (1992) (stating that trade measures should be "the least trade-restrictive
necessary to achieve the objectives," id. at 2.22(i)); WTO Agreement, Annex IA, Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 5.6 (requiring that sanitary
or phytosanitary measures not be "more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their
[objective]"); Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, arts. 2.2-2.3 (requiring restrictions
to not be "more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective" and
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were not "necessary" was based entirely on the question of directness and
coercion, and there is no attempt to incorporate the definition into its
reasoning.
The panel found that the import restrictions were too indirect in the sense
that they could not, by themselves, achieve the objective sought since it was
dependent upon another contingency, that of the policies and practices of
other countries being changed."
Indirectness was particularly clear in the
case of the intermediary ban, where the restrictions were being imposed on
countries whose fishing practices already presumably complied with those of
the United States and thus the policies to be changed were those of third
countries. But the panel also applied this reasoning to primary bans, where
the measures acted directly against the offending countries.
The panel reasoned that a coercive measure cannot, by definition, be
sufficiently direct. However, the panel considered the question further by
reference to the object and purposes of the GAT. It found that, since the
GATT's primary purpose is to provide "a multilateral framework for trade
among contracting parties," to permit unilateral acts designed to force other
countries to change their policies would be to destroy the purpose of the
GATT as a whole. 1" This point was also made in Tuna Dolphin I,
but is here stated more clearly and more emphatically.
The argument of the Tuna Dolphin H panel that the measures could not
be "necessary" or "relating to" because they were indirect and coercive needs
to be examined further. The panel presumes that indirect measures can never
be necessary or relate to their objective. This is a questionable presumption,

prohibiting measures that "can be addressed in a less trade-restrictive manner").
'9 Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 3, at paras. 5.23-24.
130 Id. at para. 5.26. Note that this concern is also expressed in Principle 12 of the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development which emphasizes the need to approach
environmental protection through economic growth and sustainable development. It states,
inter alia, that "[u]nilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the
jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing
transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an
international consensus." U.N. Doc.A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 874,
878 (1992) and in "Note by the Secretariat on the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development", GATr, BISD 39S/303, at 313-14. See also criticisms made by less
developed countries that unilateral environmental measures are used for trade protectionist
purposes, e.g., Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, Using Trade Sanctions and Subsidies to Achieve
Environmental Objectives in the Pacific Rim, 4 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L. L. & POL'Y 296

(1993).

131 Tuna

Dolphin I, supra note 1, at paras. 5.27, 5.32.
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as it unreasonably restricts the kind of measures which may be employed
under Article XX. There are some situations where trade restrictions are
necessary. For example, they may be necessary because domestic restrictions
will be ineffective or at least lead to economic hardship if foreign competitors are allowed to benefit from their lack of regulation. They may be
necessary because resources located extraterritorially are part of the global
commons, and because the free-rider problem must be dealt with in order to
protect them.
Where countries have an economic interest in a resource which they
exploit outside their territorial jurisdiction, it makes a great deal more sense
to suggest that they will have the same incentive to conserve as they would
within their territory. However, when the object of a measure is to
implement a policy falling within the extraterritorial jurisdiction, all trade
measures will be a means of persuading or coercing producers to modify
their behavior. Thus the panel's interpretation of directness automatically
negates the value of its previous finding that extraterritorial policies may be
covered by Article XX(b) and (g) provided they fall within a state's
jurisdiction over its nationals and vessels.
The fundamental reason for the Tuna Dolphin II panel's finding, however,
is not so much based on a semantic interpretation of Article XX as the fear
that an acceptance of unilateral, coercive measures would mean that the
GATT could no longer serve as a multilateral framework for international
trade. While the concern over coercion is clearly legitimate, 32 it may be
wondered whether it need be expressed in such absolute terms. To draw the
line in Article XX so that no coercive measures may be permitted is to play
very safe in terms of protecting the GATT principles of free trade. Earlier
in its report, the panel recognized that paragraph (e) of the same article
33
permits effectively the same kind of measure in relation to prison labor.
It may be argued that restrictions on the product of prison labor are merely
34
a protection against the use of presumably unpaid or underpaid workers.
Such measures can be categorized as a legitimate exception which permits

132 See, e.g., Schoenbaum, supra note 9, at 723 (arguing that to permit unilateral measures
"would invite chaos and retaliation" and "would reduce international trade to a power-based
regime that would have no stability or rationality"); Jackson, World Trade Rules and
EnvironmentalPolicies,supra note 9, at 1240 (discussing the slippery slope problem involved
in permitting unilateral, extraterritorial environmental measures).
3 Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 3, at para. 5.16.
14 See argument by the EEC and the Netherlands on this point. Id. at para. 3.35.
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contracting parties to protect themselves against unfair competition. But the
same is also true of legislation such as the MMPA, which may also be
categorized as protecting domestic industry against a foreign industry and
may therefore be considered as unfair. In that sense, the import restrictions
are genuinely intended to make domestic restrictions on production and
consumption effective as provided for in paragraph (g). To put it the other
way round, it is just as easy to categorize paragraph (e) as coercive. Such
an argument does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that paragraph (g)
permits coercive measures, but it does call into question the statement that
such an interpretation would signal the effective death of the GATT as a
multilateral framework for international trade.
C. Arbitrary or UnjustifiedDiscriminationand DisguisedTrade Restrictions

The preamble of Article XX has received relatively little attention in panel
reports and, to the extent that it has been considered, has been relegated to

a nominal last resort. The phrase "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail" has been interpreted
as being satisfied provided the restrictions in question are applied equally to
products from other countries."' This seems quite uncontroversial, but the
interpretation of the other phrase in the preamble, that measures should not
constitute "disguised restriction on international trade", is more difficult to
explain. So far it has been found to be sufficient if the measure has been
publicly announced1 36 and where the substantive and procedural requirements of the measure have been complied with.1 37 The ease with which
the test may be satisfied seems strange in the light of the apparent meaning
of the words, which would suggest an intention to investigate and exclude
measures which, on their face, satisfy one of the paragraphs of Article XX
38
but in fact are being used for trade-restricting or protectionist purposes.
There is evidence from the drafting history that this was precisely the

131See Spring Assemblies, supra note 85, at paras. 54-55; Canada Tuna, supra note 85,

at para. 4.8.
"3 See Spring Assemblies, supra note 85, at para. 56; Canada Tuna, supra note 85, at
para. 4.8.
137 See Spring Assemblies, supra note 85, at para. 56.
138This is the interpretation used by a United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement panel
when considering an equivalent provision. In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement
for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring Panel Report, Oct. 16, 1989, at paras. 7.04, 7.11.
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intention.' 39
Despite the sketchy and tentative approach to the preamble made by
GATT panels so far, there is clearly scope for a WTO/GATT panel to
enquire into the intent and effect of any measure which otherwise satisfies
one of the categories of exceptions in Article XX. Arguably, this would
relieve some of the weight presently placed on the questions of extraterritoriality and directness, and permit a shift of emphasis toward the prevention of
protectionist measures which is the most important aspect of Article XX and
the WTO/GATT system as a whole.
IV. CONCLUSION

Running through the Tuna Dolphin IHpanel's discussion of Article I and
the extraterritorial scope of Article XX was concern about the use of
unilateral trade measures which would unduly interfere with the freedom of
action to which other states were entitled under the GATT. Under Article
III, unilateralism was primarily restricted by the use of the 'product as such'
test. With regard to Article XX, the first step in dealing with this concern
was to find that the policies permitted under paragraphs (b) and (g) were
confined to matters falling within a country's jurisdiction over its nationals
and vessels and that paragraph (g) was concerned with making effective
domestic restrictions and therefore protecting domestic interests. The second
step was to require a very close degree of directness between a measure and
its objective and to exclude any element of coercion under both paragraphs,
thus limiting their scope essentially to the domestic sphere. The U.S.
Automobile Taxes panel did not challenge this reasoning, although it applied
it in a more liberal fashion. It also showed the same concern as the panel
in U.S. Alcohol about an unnecessarily intrusive interpretation of Article Im
and the need to concentrate on the policy of preventing protectionist
measures. The question remains, however, whether the reasoning of the
Tuna Dolphin panels should continue to be accepted or whether there should
be some more flexible, though still principled, accommodation of environmental concerns expressed through unilateral acts.
The reasoning of both Tuna Dolphin panels is based on the purposive
interpretation of the GATT. Their findings that the MMPA measures were
inconsistent with Article I and could not be saved under Article XX rely

139See GUIDE TO GATr LAW AND PRACTICE 519-20 (1994).
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heavily on the assumption that unilateral and coercive trade measures will
destroy the object of the GATT as a whole." It is clear that multilateral
agreements have considerable advantages over unilateral acts; there is far less
suspicion of protectionist motives where a significant number of states have
adopted a common standard than when it is imposed by only one, even
where a convincing non-trade policy purpose exists.
However, the existence of multilateral treaties by themselves cannot be
used as a substantive defense except between states already party to them.
In addition, progress in achieving legal undertakings and wide ratification
can be achingly slow, while the free-rider problem in global environmental
schemes requires some response. Where an environmental problem is
perceived to be urgent and, in particular, where there are actual and potential
effects on individual states, the pressure to employ unilateral trade measures
will remain.
If unilateralism is likely to continue and even become more common than
at present, then the WTO/GATI" system must find some way of accommodating it in a way that safeguards its own purposes, while at the same time
acknowledging legitimate, non-trade concerns of its member states. As
reasoned above, one step would be to soften the 'product as such' test by
relying on a test of protective effect or intention, thereby concentrating on
the fundamental purpose of Article III, the prevention of protectionism under
the guise of achieving non-trade policies. In addition, the extraterritorial
reach of Article XX (b) and (g), which are most likely to be invoked in aid
of environmental measures, could be extended to measures where the needs
of the regulating state need to be balanced with the needs of other states
without undue interference within the territorial jurisdiction of the latter.
Notably this would occur where injury occurred through transboundary
effects, such as air pollution, or in the global commons where the activities
of one state may have a direct effect on another, such as damage to the
ozone layer or deprivation of resources caused by the endangerment of a
species. The question of indirectness would also have to be re-examined, to
permit trade measures which would be used to reinforce, as well as enforce
domestic restrictions. The concerns of preventing protectionism could be
adequately met by relying more heavily on the preambular conditions that
trade measures must not be "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" or
"disguised restrictions on trade". This would provide a more coherent
interpretation of the GATT as a whole, and would provide greater room for
"4See Schoenbaumn, supra note 9, at 720-23; Black, supra note 9, at 145-52.
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accommodating non-trade policies provided their trade effects were
incidental.
The WTO/GATT system cannot, and should not, squeeze out unilateralism
altogether; it is neither designed nor at present willing to incorporate values
other than those of free trade. The 'legalization' of the dispute settlement
procedures under the WTO Agreement offers an opportunity to pursue a
balanced and proportionate interpretation of the GATT rules, 14' and
ultimately the harmonization of standards and legal rules will be necessary
to eliminate the most troublesome disparities. In the meantime, however, the
issues of environmentalism will not disappear. The WTO/GATT system is
right to think that multilateral agreements are the better solution, but it
cannot disregard the urgency of unilateral standards which are designed, not
to be protectionist, but to protect important non-trade values.

141 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
1994.

